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Abstract
We present sec-cs, a hash-table-like data structure for
file contents on untrusted storage that is both secure and
storage-efficient. We achieve authenticity and confiden-
tiality with zero storage overhead using deterministic au-
thenticated encryption. State-of-the-art data deduplica-
tion approaches prevent redundant storage of shared parts
of different contents irrespective of whether relationships
between contents are known a priori or not.
Instead of just adapting existing approaches, we intro-
duce novel (multi-level) chunking strategies, ML-SC and
ML-CDC, which are significantly more storage-efficient
than existing approaches in presence of high redundancy.
We prove sec-cs’s security, publish a ready-to-use
implementation, and present results of an extensive an-
alytical and empirical evaluation that show its suitability
for, e.g., future backup systems that should preserve many
versions of files on little available cloud storage.
1 Introduction
Cloud storage solutions have become increasingly pop-
ular among customers. They usually provide a limited
amount of storage space that is accessed over the inter-
net and used for synchronization of personal data between
devices or for backup purposes, e.g., by using rsync [39]
to synchronize a user’s important data to the cloud stor-
age in frequent intervals. Ideally, cheap creation of snap-
shots should be supported, i.e., the user should be able to
preserve lots of consistent copies of specific states of her
backed up data without being charged for redundant or du-
plicate data. Such snapshots/versioning features are pro-
vided by many cloud storage providers, e.g., Dropbox [7].
Unfortunately, security guarantees of today’s popular
providers are insufficient: Malicious providers could read
and modify data unnoticed by their users. The above-
described scenario, thus, requires application of crypto-
graphic measures on the client side as to ensure confi-
dentiality and authenticity of outsourced data. Secure
encryption using tools like GnuPG [13], however, hides
any information about file contents—including differ-
ences across versions—from the provider, thus preventing
any savings from its snapshots feature. Only few systems
try to combine security and storage efficiency; neither is
both secure and able to provide efficiency comparable to
unencrypted cloud storage to the best of our knowledge.
Consequentially, users have to decide between cheap &
comfortable and expensive & secure solutions today.
As we consider both aspects equally important, our
goal is to advance development of practical solutions (e.g.,
backup systems) for cloud storage with strong security
and better efficiency guarantees. To this end, we present
a novel data structure for file contents on untrusted cloud
storage, sec-cs, with the following contributions:
• We design and integrate a novel chunking-based data
deduplication concept, ML-*, that outperforms exist-
ing approaches w.r.t. storage efficiency when storing
contents with high redundancy.
• We achieve strong confidentiality and authenticity
guarantees of stored data with zero storage overhead.
• We further publish a ready-to-use implementation
and evaluate its efficiency analytically and empiri-
cally, proving superiority to other approaches.
This paper is structured as follows: We give background
information and present related work in Sec. 2. ML-*
is introduced in Sec. 3 and detailed as part of sec-cs,
which is described in Sec. 4 and proven secure in Sec. 5.
Our implementation is discussed in Sec. 6 and an evalua-
tion is presented in Sec. 7. Sec. 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
As both data deduplication (i.e., elimination of redun-
dancy across stored data), and security are essential goals
of sec-cs, different kinds of existing work are related.
2.1 Data Deduplication
Existing deduplication systems apply some determin-
istic chunking scheme C to a content to split it into
non-overlapping chunks, and avoid storage of resulting
chunks that have already been stored before, usually by
maintaining an index of cryptographic hash values of
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chunks. An overview and a classification of common ap-
proaches and their efficiency is provided by Meister and
Brinkmann [25]: Whole-file chunking (WFC) yields a sin-
gle chunk and is thus able to detect identical file con-
tents. Static chunking (SC) splits a content into chunks
of fixed size that are individually deduplicated, so par-
tially overlapping contents can be deduplicated as well.
It is used, e.g., in Venti. [30] Content-defined chunking
(CDC), in contrast, can even tolerate shifted contents. It
determines chunk boundaries by moving a sliding win-
dow of some fixed size W over the content and creating
chunk boundaries when a window content meets a spe-
cific criterion, typically a hash value being in a specific
range. This yields chunks of some expected length—the
target chunk length—under the assumption that different
positions have different window contents and hash val-
ues are uniformly distributed. To deal with non-uniformly
distributed contents, a minimum and maximum chunk
size can be set. The scheme was introduced by Muthi-
tacharoen et al. [28] for the low-bandwidth network file
system and is usually implemented using a rolling hash,
e.g., Rabin fingerprints [31]. Alternatives to the basic slid-
ing window approach usually used for CDC that might be
worth consideration for future enhancements of sec-cs
are presented by Eshghi and Tang [10]. According to [25],
SC yields better deduplication efficiency than WFC and
CDC is more efficient than SC for real-life data. Few
systems like ADMAD [23] are able to achieve even bet-
ter efficiency by employing application-specific chunk-
ing (ASC). ASC, however, requires additional knowledge
about the respective file format of a content.
Instead of simply avoiding multiple storage of identi-
cal chunks, some systems employ delta encoding: When
a highly similar chunk—a base chunk—is known, a new
chunk is represented as a reference to the base chunk and
a difference, i.e., a sequence of actions that define how to
create it from the base chunk. In combination with WFC,
this scheme is, e.g., used in version control systems (VCS)
like Subversion (SVN) [38]. SVN’s FSFS backend stores
the first revision of a file content in its entirety and all sub-
sequent revisions as differences to previous revisions. [4]
A comparison of advantages of the different schemes
is shown in Tab. 1: Delta-based approaches are clearly
able to yield lowest storage costs for changed contents in
principle, but they have important limitations in practice:
First, their efficiency depends on a priori knowledge of
relations between chunks—a problem tackled by, e.g., the
DERD framework [6]. Second, they substantially increase
retrieval costs as reconstruction of delta-encoded chunks
requires retrieval of corresponding base chunks of which
only parts are actually required. Chunking-based schemes
achieve savings when storing changed contents (data) ir-
respective of knowledge about relations (their best values
are highlighted in green in the table). The most efficient
Storage costs for... Delta WFC SC CDC ASC ML-SC ML-CDC
single file (data) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n)
single file (metadata) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n)
single file (Σ) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n)
change w/o shift (D) O(1) O(n) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1)
change w/o shift (M) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(logn) O(logn)
change w/o shift (Σ) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(logn) O(logn)
change w/ shift (D) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(1)
change w/ shift (M) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(logn)
change w/ shift (Σ) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(logn)
Efficiency is independent from file content’s...
size 3 3 7 7 7 3 3
uniform distribution 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
precise format 3 3 3 3 7 3 3
relation to others 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1: Efficiency of dedup. concepts (n: content length)
strategies CDC / ASC yield their savings depending on
the distribution of contents / specific file formats.
In addition to the costs for the actual content data, ev-
ery data deduplication mechanism incurs storage costs
for metadata: In case of WFC, this is only a small con-
stant per content corresponding to its cryptographic hash
value. Chunking-based schemes do not only incur this
overhead for every chunk, but they also require additional
storage space to store of which chunks a specific content
consists—typically a list of chunk identifiers, e.g., cryp-
tographic hash values. Although the respective constants
are small for large chunk sizes, metadata storage costs for
contents deduplicated via SC, CDC and ASC are linear
in their lengths no matter how high their redundancy is.
These scheme’s chunk size parameters, thus, considerably
impact their storage efficiency, as also noticed by Eshghi
and Tang [10]: If set too high, deduplication performance
is decreased, as only completely identical chunks allow
space savings. If set too small, storage of contents with
high redundancy cause considerable overhead due to the
sheer amount of chunk references that have to be stored.
This problem is solved by our proposals ML-SC / ML-
CDC: Due to a specific, multi-level application of SC /
CDC, we achieve logarithmic metadata costs, allowing
high storage efficiency even for small chunk sizes, inde-
pendent from content sizes. To the best of our knowledge,
our strategy is unique. Teodosiu et al. [37] apply CDC re-
cursively to enable efficient replication of files over a net-
work (assuming the receiver has a similar file to the one
being transferred), but they do not target storage systems
and fail to achieve logarithmic costs due to a fixed recur-
sion depth. Further, their approach is different to ours:
Instead of breaking large chunks recursively into smaller
ones, they generate the smallest chunks first and use CDC
recursively to break lists of chunk references into smaller
parts—requiring multiple passes. Yasa and Nagesh [1]
employ hierarchical chunking starting with CDC at the
highest level as we do, but they use only two levels (SC at
second level), so storage overhead is still linear.
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2.2 Security
Lots of works exist in the related fields of cloud security
and cryptographic file systems, but only few focus on au-
thenticity and storage efficiency. Popular cloud storage
security solutions typically deal with confidentiality only.
BoxCryptor [3], e.g., is based on and uses a similar con-
cept to EncFS [9]: It encrypts file contents symmetrically,
but does not provide authenticity. While not preventing
storage-efficient snapshots of unchanged files, costs for
changed files are high due to entirely different ciphertexts.
SiRiUS [14], Plutus [19] and Tahoe-LAFS [42] are ex-
amples of file systems with authenticity guarantees: They
apply SC to contents and compute a Merkle tree [26] over
the chunks to allow authenticity verification even for parts
of contents, but they do not support data deduplication:
Tahoe-LAFS creates entirely different ciphertexts for sim-
ilar file contents, the other systems even for identical ones.
To allow efficient usage of cloud storage for, e.g., back-
ups, more specialized tools are required. Common backup
tools like duplicity [8] rely on incremental backups, i.e.,
they store differences to previous backups. This can be
used in combination with GnuPG to preserve snapshots in
a storage-efficient and secure manner, but causes commu-
nication overhead when specific versions are read. VCS
could be used for delta-based backups to a limited ex-
tent, but they are typically inefficient w.r.t. large files and
have limited security properties: Git [12] only ensures in-
tegrity/authenticity of the version history by integrating
signatures. SVN does not, but an extension [22] adds
storage-efficient file-level encryption. Cumulus [41] is
a backup system that supports large files and allows di-
rect access to arbitrary snapshots, but it is less storage-
efficient as it only deduplicates identical data between dif-
ferent versions of individual files. Farsite [5], in contrast,
is a distributed file system targeting on chunking-based
backups that deduplicates different identical files despite
secure encryption. It cannot save space for snapshots of
different versions of a file, though, as it relies on WFC.
Storer et al. [35] extend Farsite’s concept to CDC, but they
do not provide any explicit authenticity guarantees.
Many more works exist in the field of cloud storage se-
curity. Most of them, however, have a different focus and
are orthogonal to our work. Athos [15], e.g., is a solu-
tion for outsourcing file systems that achieves integrity in
a way that file system operations are possible with loga-
rithmic communication costs. The solution is orthogonal
to our work in the sense that this requirement is w.r.t. the
total number of files/directories in the file system and not
w.r.t. the size of single file contents. A similar goal is
pursued by Heitzmann et al. [18]. Both works are based
on authenticated skip lists, an authenticated data structure
(ADS) initially proposed by Goodrich et al. [16], while
our work is based on another ADS—the Merkle tree [26].
ADS, in general, is an umbrella term for data structures
involving three parties (a trusted source who publishes
data, an untrusted responder that stores structured data,
and a user that requests data) that enable authenticated, ef-
ficient queries to the data. [36] In this sense, sec-cs can
be considered an ADS with additional data deduplication
and confidentiality properties: The cloud storage backend
can be considered the responder and the user/client plays
the roles of source and user. An overview of existing ADS
and methods for constructing ADS in general are provided
by Martel et al. [24] and Miller et al. [27].
3 ML-* – Multi-Level Chunking
Our first contribution are the chunking strategies ML-SC
and ML-CDC which improve on the state of the art in
terms of storage efficiency in presence of high redundancy
(see Tab. 1). The basic idea is simple: As the linear over-
head for storing contents with a traditional strategy C is
caused by the need of storing references to each constant-
size part of each content, we want to also deduplicate
these references. This can be achieved by representing
the results of C on a content m as a chunk tree t, whose
• leaf nodes represent the chunks output by C, and
• inner nodes aggregate chunks, representing the con-
catenation of chunks represented by their children.
In addition to leaf chunks (chunks represented by leaf
nodes), we thus create “larger” superchunks (chunks rep-
resented by inner nodes), which we persist as well and
which can be referenced directly when new contents are
stored. Consequentially, each content is represented by
one persisted root chunk (the chunk represented by the
tree’s root node, which might be a leaf or superchunk).
Persisting a superchunk requires storing references to
its children. To ease notation, we refer to storage costs
of a chunk representation as its size and to the length of
its represented content as its length. For leaf chunks we
assume size is equal to length. To enable high storage effi-
ciency, we require sublinear storage overhead for storing
a content m′ having large overlaps with an existing con-
tent m. For this, we generate their chunk trees t, t′ so that
the following requirements are met:
R1: the (expected) size of each chunk is constant,
R2: identical parts of m and m′ share not only leaf, but
also superchunks (i.e., t and t′ share subtrees), and
R3: the heights of t and t′ are chosen logarithmically in
the lengths of m and m′, respectively.
Thus, if m′ differs from m in only one byte, t and t′ shall
be equal except for one chunk at each level, so that their
difference consists of O (log |m|) constant-size chunks.
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Different chunking strategies allow to achieve this. In
the simplest case, we could aggregate fixed numbers of
consecutive chunks output by SC to superchunks, and
continue aggregating fixed numbers of subsequent super-
chunks until only a single superchunk—the root chunk—
remains. This approach, however, would eradicate advan-
tages of chunking schemes that go beyond those of SC.
While leaf chunks output by CDC, for example, are ro-
bust against shifting, this property would not be true for
superchunks. To account for that, we define our multi-
level chunking scheme in a more general way that pre-
serves the properties of its underlying chunking algorithm
C. The only requirements we state is that C has to be deter-
ministic and that it has a parameter S that allows to spec-
ify the target (or expected) length of its generated chunks.
Now letR < S be the size required for representing a sin-
gle chunk reference, i.e., anything that allows retrieval of
the corresponding chunk (R is constant as chunks will be
referenced by hash values). We define ML-C as follows:
• On input a content m with length n = |m|, choose
the height h of the to-be-built chunk tree t as
h = min
h′∈N
{
h′ | n ≤ S
h′+1
Rh′
}
=
⌈
log
(
n
S
)
log
(
S
R
)⌉ , S > R (1)
where h = 0 describes a single-node tree.
• Create root node of t that should represent m.
• Iterate over the nodes of the tree in a breadth-first
search manner. For each node with height h′ > 0
(beginning with the root node having height h′ = h),
– determine content m˜ that the node represents,
– apply the chunking strategy C on m˜ with target
chunk length S
h′
Rh′−1
, and
– add child node for each chunk m˜′ output by C.
This way, a content smaller than or equal to the target
chunk size S results in a single leaf node, and for n ≥ S,
all leaf chunks have target chunk size S. As superchunks
at height h′ have expected length S
h′+1
Rh′
and are chun-
ked with target chunk length S
h′
Rh′−1
, they are expected to
have SR children. As child references have size R, the ex-
pected size of superchunks is S as well, fulfilling Req. R1.
Req. R3 is met by the choice of h and Req. R2 is expected
to be achieved due to straightforward application of C at
each level. The latter is concretized in Sec. 4.4.1 and dis-
cussed and evaluated in detail in Sec. 7.
4 sec-cs – The Secure Content Store
For a detailed analysis, we embed ML-* in a generic
data structure that is described in this section. sec-cs
acts like a normal hash table that assigns a deterministi-
cally computed hash value to each inserted content, but
comes with a combination of properties different from
prior work: It employs multi-level chunking to signifi-
cantly reduce storage overhead for large overlapping con-
tents and it guarantees authenticity and confidentiality.
Note that sec-cs is limited to immutable contents,
i.e., it does not support deletion of contents. We present
this variant as it is sufficient for the evaluation of ML-*,
but we emphasize that it is easy to extend it to a mutable
variant, either by allowing deletion of root nodes (requir-
ing a garbage collection for non-referenced chunks), or
using reference counters for chunks (at the cost of some
slight storage overhead). In fact, our implementation (see
Sec. 6) supports the latter.
4.1 Prerequisites
sec-cs requires a backend to persist data. Low-level
storage management is out of scope of this paper, though.
Instead, we assume the existence of a backend providing
the following key-value store (KVS) interface:
• PUT(k, v)—persist value v under key k
• GET(k)—return v or ⊥ if key k does not exist
Note that the KVS interface can be easily mapped
to any commonly-used storage backend: Key-value
databases and many cloud (object) storage providers
can be accessed by this interface and a mapping to a
file/directory structure in a file system could be done in a
straightforward manner. The major requirement is that the
backend can deal efficiently with many key/value pairs.
4.2 Threat Model
The goal of sec-cs is to allow efficient and secure usage
of existing cloud storage for storing file contents, espe-
cially in presence of many (similar) versions of contents
and an untrusted cloud storage provider. Towards this
goal, our model includes two parties, a user (client) and
a backend (server). The user is assumed to be completely
trustworthy: She instantiates the data structure and locally
executes its operations in order to change its state. Any
operation invocation done by the user is considered legiti-
mate. The user is required to locally store and keep secret
a fixed number of constant-size cryptographic keys. The
backend does not need to be trustworthy at all. It might
read any stored data and also write, overwrite or delete any
data as to perform malicious modifications (e.g., changes
to file contents) that remain undetected by the user. The
only restriction is that it is assumed not to be able to get
access to the client’s cryptographic keys.
We aim for achieving authenticity in the sense that only
contents actually inserted into sec-cs by the user can be
successfully retrieved, and we aim for confidentiality in
the sense that the backend cannot obtain any part of any
stored content. Security guarantees are defined formally
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in conjunction with efficiency goals in Sec. 4.4 due to their
interdependence. A general overview is given beforehand.
Note that the model allows a backend to mount DoS
attacks (e.g., deleting data). As such attacks are detectable
by a user, a backend has a financial incentive in avoiding
it. Also, it could be prevented easily via replication.
4.3 Security Concept
Due to its storage efficiency guarantees, sec-cs requires
a tailored security concept. We discuss reasons and design
decisions now and give a formal definition thereafter.
Using cryptographic hash values to reference nodes of
a chunk tree yields a Merkle-tree[26]-like data structure
that trivially guarantees integrity of a content given the
identifier of the root node of its chunk tree. We can use
a message authentication code (MAC) with a secret, sym-
metric key instead of an unkeyed hash to also guarantee
authenticity of contents stored in the data structure.
Integration of confidentiality is more complicated: For
ideal guarantees, we would have to encrypt contents
(e.g., using a symmetric block cipher) before construct-
ing their chunk trees as to authenticate their ciphertexts
(encrypt-then-authenticate). Unfortunately, this would
prevent data deduplication: With a randomized encryption
scheme, deduplication would not be possible at all, and
with a deterministic scheme, deduplication would only be
possible at the granularity of complete contents. To allow
for storage efficiency, we have to employ encryption at the
granularity of the chunks that are to be deduplicated.
A straightforward application of the generally favor-
able encrypt-then-authenticate approach on chunk tree
node representations utilizing a randomized encryption
scheme, however, would still prevent deduplication as
even identical chunk tree nodes yielded different MAC
tags (thus different keys) due to different ciphertexts.
Authenticate-then-encrypt can also be considered secure
for specific instantiations [20], but randomized encryption
of MAC tags would lead to the same problem. The third
option would be encrypt-and-authenticate. If applied to
chunk tree nodes during insertion into the backend, dedu-
plication would be possible even with randomized encryp-
tion, as each chunk tree node was associated a random-
ized ciphertext during its first insertion without affecting
other parts of the data structure. Application of encrypt-
and-authenticate, however, is generically considered inse-
cure even for practical MAC instantiations1, thus requir-
ing a careful analysis of the security properties actually
achieved by any specific instantiation.2 [20]
1i.e. MAC schemes whose tags do not leak information about inputs
2Note that some generic security flaws of encrypt-and-authenticate
do not apply in the specific setting at hand as equality of plaintexts is
intentionally leaked for the sake of data deduplication, anyway.
To avoid any of these potential pitfalls, we achieve con-
fidentiality and authenticity by using an authenticated,
deterministic encryption scheme to encrypt and authenti-
cate chunk tree nodes before their insertion into the back-
end. Block cipher modes like EAX [2] and OCB [33, 21]
would be suitable for this purpose. They provide confi-
dentiality and authenticity and their ciphertexts are length-
preserving (except for the authentication tag), eliminat-
ing padding-induced storage overhead. These schemes,
however, depend on a nonce that would have to be stored
somehow to allow decryption of persisted chunks, which
again caused overhead. The SIV construction [34] solves
this issue: by using a plaintext’s MAC tag as IV for
an underlying, conventional IV-based encryption scheme
(e.g., CTR mode), it achieves authentication and length-
preserving encryption. While SIV depends on a nonce,
too, it is resistant to nonce reuse in the sense that no
more information than whether two encrypted plaintexts
are identical is leaked. [17] As this is leaked intentionally
in our system to allow deduplication, it is safe to use SIV
without a nonce, leading to storage costs identical to those
of an authentication-only solution (i.e., overhead equals
authentication tag size).
4.4 Formal Definition
The data structure is now described in detail, including its
interface, formal goals and internal algorithms.
4.4.1 Interface and Goals
The minimum operation set for a content data structure
includes insertion and retrieval:
• k ← PUTCONTENT(m) shall insert the content m
into sec-cs and make it accessible by the key k.
We state the following storage efficiency goals:
G1: The (expected) increase of the data
structure’s storage consumption caused by
PUTCONTENT(m) should be in O (|m|).
G2: If m is highly redundant, i.e., another m′
is already stored that is identical to m except
for a single sequence of δ bytes, the expected
increase in storage consumption caused by
PUTCONTENT(m) shall be inO (δ + log |m|).
Note that G2 is defined rather vaguely. Its precise
semantics depends on the choice of C: For SC, the
difference between contents m and m′ is defined as
the smallest byte range that would have to be copied
from m to m′ to turn m′ into m, or vice versa. Since
CDC supports shifting of contents, some differences
between two contents can be represented more com-
pactly, i.e., by a sequence of bytes that is inserted at
or removed from a specific byte offset of one content.
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The more efficient the underlying chunking scheme,
the stronger is thus the goal.
• m ← GETCONTENT(k) shall retrieve a content m
previously inserted into sec-cs via the key k.
We state the following authenticity goal:
G3: If any call k′ ← PUTCONTENT(m′) with
k′ = k has been issued before, then it holds
m ∈ {m′,⊥}.3
Goal G2 implies the more general case of m / m′ be-
ing different in δ bytes spread over x different positions:
Imagine the sequencem′ = m0,m1, . . .,mx−1,mx = m
of intermediate contents withmi containing the first i dif-
ferences between m′ and m and let δi refer to the num-
ber of bytes changed between mi−1 and mi. If each of
these contents was inserted one after another, insertion of
mi would cause an increase in storage consumption of
O (δi + log |mi|), totaling O (
∑x
i=1 (δi + log |mi|)) for
all contents. The sizes of m1, . . . ,mx are upper-bounded
by |m|, so total increase in storage consumption is in
O (δ + x log |m|). This boundary sublinear in the length
ofmwould not be possible if only leaf chunks were dedu-
plicated, so Goal G2 implies Req. R2.
As any operation execution has to preserve confiden-
tiality of all contents ever stored, we state the confiden-
tiality goal independent from a specific operation:
G4: For each content m ever inserted into the data
structure, the storage provider must not learn any-
thing beyond (a) its length, (b) chunk bound-
ary positions leaked by C for target chunk sizes
S, S
2
R , . . . ,
Sh
Rh−1 , where h is chosen as in Eq. 1 for
n = |m|, and (c) equality of chunks of m accord-
ing to the aforementioned chunk boundary positions
(w.r.t. all leaf chunks and superchunks ever stored).
Note that constraints G4b and G4c are unavoidable for
achieving storage efficiency, as worked out in Sec. 4.3.
Thus, strength of Goal G4 is highly dependent on C.
4.4.2 Parameters
The data structure’s efficiency can be tuned by setting the
following parameter during initialization:
• S is the target chunk size, i.e., the expected size of
leaf/superchunks generated by multi-level chunking.
Further, there is an implementation-specific parameter R
referring to the storage consumption of chunk references
in superchunk representations. We require S ≥ 2R,
which will allow us to meet Goal G1 (see Sec. 5).
3This has two important implications: We neither employ measures
against malicious deletion of contents nor against rollback attacks, and
there are no guarantees that a retrieved content has been inserted before.
The reason is that we do not distinguish between contents and chunks in
the data structure, so chunks of contents can be retrieved directly.
4.4.3 Required Algorithms and Assumptions
sec-cs is based on some algorithms and assumptions:
• Let ΠE = (GENE , ENCAUTH,DECVRFY) be
a DAE-secure (see [34]), deterministic authen-
ticated encryption scheme that generates length-
preserving ciphertexts and message authentication
codes (MACs) of lengthD. Note that MACs are used
to reference chunks, so it holds R = D.
• Let C be a deterministic, single-level chunking
scheme that produces chunks of a (configurable) ex-
pected length S′ as used in Sec. 3.
• We assume that the backend’s storage costs for stor-
ing a key-value pair (k, v) are in O (|k|+ |v|).
4.4.4 Operations
Now we are ready to define the behaviour.
Initialization When sec-cs is initialized, parameter
S is specified and GENE is executed to determine a sym-
metric cryptographic key K for authenticated encryption.
Content Insertion: k ← PUTCONTENT(m) Insertion
of contents is performed according to the definition of
ML-C (see Sec. 3) which is refined here. First, the height
h of the chunk tree t for contentm is calculated according
to Eq. 1. The tree is then built and its nodes are persisted
by executing the recursive Alg. 1, which utilizes C to per-
form the appropriate chunking of the content at each indi-
vidual level and yields some key k′ for the root node. We
return k = (k′, h) as the content’s key.4
Each node is persisted by the algorithm using PUT.
Confidentiality is achieved by encrypting node representa-
tions; deduplication+authentication are achieved by using
MACs as keys. As superchunks are represented as lists of
their children’s keys, this yields a Merkle-Tree-like struc-
ture of MAC values, achieving authentication of contents.
Algorithm 1 Chunk insertion
Precondition: m′ is content, h′ ≥ 0 height of to-be-created tree
1: function PUTCHUNK(m′, h′)
2: if h′ = 0 then . create leaf chunk
3: c′, k′← ENCAUTH(K,m′)
4: PUT(k′, c′)
5: else . create superchunk
6: children← []
7: Apply C tom′ with target chunk length Sh
′
Rh
′−1
8: for all chunksm′′ produced by C do . create children
9: children.append(PUTCHUNK(m′′, h′ − 1))
10: c′, k′← ENCAUTH(K, children)
11: if GET(k′) = ⊥ then
12: PUT(k′, c′) . only insert new chunk
13: return k′
4Inclusion of h is an auxiliary construction. It enables equal length
and size for leaf chunks by not requiring storage of the node type.
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Content Retrieval: m← GETCONTENT(k) Retrieval
of a content works similar to its insertion. First, the root
chunk key k′ and the tree’s height h′ are extracted from
the content key k. Afterwards, the recursive Alg. 2 is ex-
ecuted, which retrieves all nodes of the chunk tree and
concatenates its leaf chunks, yielding the corresponding
content m. Each node is decrypted and checked for au-
thenticity on that way. The algorithm aborts if any node
is missing or any node with an erroneous MAC tag is re-
trieved from the backend. The operation yields ⊥ then.
Algorithm 2 Chunk retrieval
Precondition: k′ is chunk key, h′ ≥ 0 the height of its chunk tree
1: function GETCHUNK(k′, h′)
2: c′← GET(k′)
3: v′← DECVRFY(K, c′, k′)
4: if DECVRFY failed then Failure . abort on invalid MAC
5: return v′ if h′ = 0 else ‖k′′∈v′GETCHUNK(k′′, h′ − 1)
We also designed optimized, non-recursive variants of
these operations, which are equivalent but more computa-
tionally efficient as they need only a single pass of chunk-
ing. They are omitted from the paper due to space restric-
tions, but included in our implementation (see Sec. 6).
5 Correctness and Security Analysis
We show that the operations from Sec. 4.4.4 achieve the
goals from Sec. 4.4.1. Note that the ability of C to produce
chunks of an expected length is crucial for the discussion.
Content Insertion Insertion builds a chunk tree whose
nodes at each level each represent the whole inserted con-
tent. All nodes are persisted in the backend and made
accessible by individual keys. As the root node’s key tran-
sitively allows access to all nodes, the operation is consis-
tent with the required interface. Regarding storage effi-
ciency, we already showed a constant expected per-chunk
storage consumption in Sec. 3. Thus, it is sufficient to
consider the number of modified chunks to analyze the
asymptotic storage costs incurred by the operation.
Goal G1 requiring linear storage costs for a content m
is achieved due to the following argument: As size and
length are equal for leaf chunks and as there cannot be
more than |m| leaf chunks in total, storage costs of all leaf
chunks are inO (|m|). Further, as we have S ≥ 2R, every
superchunk is expected to have at least two children, im-
plying less expected superchunks than leaf chunks. This
proves an expected total storage consumption of O (|m|).
Goal G2 is analyzed in detail in Sec. 7, so we only pro-
vide an informal argument at this point: As described in
Sec. 3, a content differing in one byte from an existing
content has storage consumption O (log |m|). The main
technical difference when δ consecutive bytes differ in-
stead of 1 byte is that those δ bytes might be spread over
multiple chunks. Concerning storage costs, this is simi-
lar to inserting those δ bytes as a separate content, so the
storage overhead is limited to O (δ), resulting in a total
storage consumption of O (δ + log |m|).
Content Retrieval Retrieval retrieves all nodes of a pre-
viously built chunk tree and concatenates its leaf chunks,
trivially fulfilling the interface. To prove authenticity, we
formalize Goal G3 with the authenticity-breaking game:
1. The data structure is initialized.
2. An adversary A is given oracle access to INSERT-
CONTENT and to the implementation of sec-cs.
She may issue queries at choice to fill it and is
granted full read/write access to the backend.
3. At some point, A outputs an identifier k.
4. We say A wins if a retrieve query for k returns m′
but an insert of a different m 6= m′ was performed
under identifier k before. Otherwise A loses.
Using this game, the authenticity property can be shown:
Claim. If MACs produced by ΠE are unforgeable under
a chosen message attack, no adversary can win the auth.-
breaking game with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Assume A wins the game with non-negligible
probability. Let k be the identifier and letm′ be the forged
content returned by retrieve. As the operation only de-
pends on GETCHUNK calls, which in turn only depend
on GET operations, at least one GET call during execu-
tion of retrieve must have returned a forged result. Let
c′ ← GET(k′) be the first such call. By definition of
Alg. 2, verification of k′ being a correct MAC for v′ must
have been true for retrieve to be successful. Then, as A
knows the algorithms used by the data structure,A is able
to find two different values v, v′ with the same MAC k
(the value she inserted initially and the forged value). As
MACs produced by ΠE are assumed to be unforgeable,
this happens only with negligible probability, contradict-
ing our assumption and proving Goal G3.
Content Confidentiality Goal G4 states that an adver-
sary must not learn anything more about any content m
ever stored in the data structure than its length, its chunk
boundaries according to the used chunking scheme, and
equality relations across all stored chunks. To prove that
no more information is leaked by any operation execu-
tion, we show that the intentionally leaked information is
sufficient for a consistent simulation of any operation.
Let M be the set of contents for which PUTCONTENT
is executed at any time, let m ∈ M be any fixed content
and let A be an adversary trying to obtain information
about m. Acc. to Constraint G4a, A is allowed to know
the content’s length n = |m|. Since the data structure’s
parameters (see Sec. 4.4.2) are public, A can, thus, deter-
mine the height h of the chunk tree t of m acc. to Eq. 1.
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Constraint G4b reveals the chunk boundaries of m out-
put by C for chunk sizes S, S2R , . . . , S
h
Rh−1 . It is easy to see
that these are exactly the chunk boundaries that are com-
puted during a legitimate PUTCONTENT(m) call, i.e., in
line 7 of every execution of Alg. 1. In combination with
the length of m,A can, thus, determine the byte ranges of
all leaf chunks and superchunks of m. This allows her to
construct an abstract chunk tree tˆ that has the exact same
structure as t, but whose nodes contain abstract chunk
representations that represent only the respective chunk’s
length instead of actual chunk representations.
Since equality of any two chunks ever stored is leaked
acc. to Constraint G4c, A can further assign a unique
identifier to any (abstract) chunk representation so that the
identifiers of two chunk representations are equal iff their
represented contents are identical. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that A assigns identifiers of the form
kˆ = (kˆ′, vˆ), where kˆ′ is a value of length R chosen uni-
formly at random and vˆ is a value chosen uniformly at ran-
dom whose length equals the represented chunk’s length
in case of a leaf chunk or y · R in case of a superchunk
with y children (A can calculate these values based on tˆ).
Now we can show that A can also be provided with the
encrypted/auth. representations of all chunks ever stored
without revealing further information about any m.
Claim. If ΠE is DAE-secure, the probability that an ad-
versary learns anything beyond G4 about any content m
from the nodes stored in the data structure is negligible.
Proof. Assume A is able to learn something from the en-
crypted and authenticated chunk representations beyond
the aforementioned information with non-negligible prob-
ability. First, it is easy to see that the lengths ofA′s previ-
ously generated chunk identifiers are equal to the lengths
of the actual chunk representations, so she cannot learn
anything from the lengths. Being able to learn something
from the chunk representations thus implies that she is
able to distinguish whether she is given the actual en-
crypted and authenticated chunk representations or just
random strings with the respective lengths.
Let A be her algorithm that on input the information
about all contents ever stored in sec-cs as stated in G4
and a complete set of chunk representations of the re-
spective lengths outputs 1 if the chunk representations are
actual chunk representations and 0 otherwise. Now con-
struct an algorithm B with access to an ENCMAC oracle
(with a randomly chosen key) as follows:
1. Initialize a new sec-cs data structure and insert all
contents m′ ∈ M , using the oracle as encryption
function, but remembering and reusing oracle out-
puts instead of asking for same input multiple times.
2. Pass all information about every content of M as
stated in G4 as well as all (encrypted and authenti-
cated) chunk representations to A, yielding output x.
3. Return x.
If B has access to an actual ENCMAC oracle, A is given
actual chunk representations as created by the data struc-
ture. If a random oracle $ with outputs of respective
lengths is given to B instead, A gets only random data.
If A is able to distinguish both cases with non-negligible
probability, B is thus able to distinguish a random oracle
from an encryption oracle with non-negligible probabil-
ity. According to the definitions given in [34],B would be
an adversary with non-negligible DAE-advantage, which
contradicts the assumption that ΠE is DAE-secure.
At this point, A knows the complete chunk tree t for
every content m ever stored in a sec-cs instance, in-
cluding the (encrypted and authenticated) chunk represen-
tation of every chunk tree node. We have already seen
that A cannot obtain more information about any content
based on this data than stated in Goal G4. Now we show
that even metadata (i.e., access patterns from individual
operation executions) do not reveal anything more about
any individual content. The idea of the proof is as follows:
When a data structure operation is executed, A can only
see KVS operation calls made by sec-cs. If A is able
to simulate any data structure operation execution to the
extent that all KVS operation calls are consistent to a real
execution based on information she already has, she does
not learn anything from a real operation execution.
Consider a PUTCONTENT(m) call. Its execution sim-
ply consists of a call of Alg. 1 with an additional argu-
ment h. Knowledge of h allows her to simulate that call,
although she cannot provide the content m to Alg. 1. The
algorithm can be executed consistently given t, though:
Consider any execution of PUTCHUNK(m′, h′). If h′ =
0, the execution corresponds to a leaf chunk of t that is
encrypted, authenticated and inserted using PUT. Since
A already knows the representation of the corresponding
chunk, she can simply issue the PUT call of line 4. Other-
wise, Alg. 1 performs chunking on the respective chunk,
issues recursive calls for the resulting chunks and inserts
an encrypted, authenticated superchunk. A can perform
the recursive calls by extracting the children of the current
chunk from t; she can determine the superchunk represen-
tation c′, k′ from line 10 as it is contained in t, and she can
issue the GET and PUT calls from lines 11–12 since they
depend only on k′, c′ and the children’s identifiers.
The call of Alg. 2 during GETCONTENT(k) is possible
for A due to the same reasons as before. Each individ-
ual recursive GETCONTENT call corresponding to a node
of t can be trivially simulated by A: The only operation
not directly executable by A is the DECVRFY call in line
3. For the simulation, though, it is sufficient to distin-
guish three cases. First, DECVRFY fails whenever k′ is
not a valid authentication tag corresponding to ciphertext
c′. SinceA knows the correct chunk representation k′′, c′′
for the respective chunk from t, she can assume the call to
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be successful iff c′′ = c′ except with negligible probabil-
ity. Second, if h′ > 0, k′ is the identifier of a superchunk,
so v′ is a list of its children’s keys, which she can sim-
ply extract from t. Only if h′ = 0, A fails to compute
v′. In this case, however, all subsequent operations per-
formed by a benign client are exclusively local (without
any feedback to the storage backend), so the simulation is
consistent and sound from an adversary’s perspective.
Thus, A is able to perform consistent simulations of all
operations, which proves Goal G4.
Note that choice of C defines a trade-off between con-
fidentiality and storage efficiency. If C, e.g., was WFC,
strongest security guarantees could be achieved (although
this would fail to achieve storage efficiency): G4b would
not leak any information at all and G4c would only leak
equality of complete contents. If SC was used, G4b would
still not leak any information as its output depends only
on a content’s length which is covered by G4a, but equal-
ity of (small) chunks naturally provides an adversary with
more information. For CDC schemes, after all, G4b be-
comes relevant as chunk boundaries are computed based
on plaintext content parts. Precise security implications
depend on the specific scheme and cannot be determined
in general. An analysis for one scheme is given in [22].
6 Implementation
To ease adoption in practice and to allow for an empirical
evaluation (see Sec. 7), we have created an implementa-
tion. The data structure including our chunking scheme
ML-* is wrapped into a flexible Python module named
seccs available for download in the Python Package In-
dex [29] or via pip install seccs. Unit tests ver-
ifying the implementation’s correctness w.r.t. Goals G1,
G2 and G3 are bundled with the module.
Since we could not find a sufficiently efficient rolling
hash Python implementation, we also developed a rolling-
hash-based chunking module fastchunking compati-
ble to seccs and available for download in PyPI as well.
It is a wrapper for parts of the highly efficient ngramhash-
ing C++ library [40] by Daniel Lemire and thus able to
outperform pure-Python implementations.
7 Evaluation
We present an extensive evaluation of sec-cs’s storage
efficiency consisting of two parts: Sec. 7.2 confirms our
stated efficiency goals both analytically and empirically
and Sec. 7.3 compares the performance of sec-cs’s
novel chunking scheme ML-* to other approaches.
7.1 Assumptions
To provide concrete numbers, we make some assump-
tions about the implementation of sec-cs. We assume
that a deterministic authenticated encryption scheme with
length-preserving ciphertexts and (D = 32)-bytes MACs
is used (e.g. AES-SIV-256), resulting in a constant storage
requirement of R = D = 32 bytes for chunk references.
By storage costs, we refer to the storage consumption
of the used KVS (see Sec. 4.1) for some state. To be inde-
pendent of any specific backend data structure, we ignore
any overheads and roughly estimate storage costs as the
sum of the sizes of the KVS’s elements, where an ele-
ment’s size is the sum of the sizes of its key and value.
7.2 Storage Performance of sec-cs
To complement the proofs from Sec. 5, we evaluate G2
in detail. We do not continue an asymptotic discussion
but work out concrete storage costs to judge suitability
of sec-cs in practice. The analytical deduction is given
below and its validity is confirmed empirically afterwards.
7.2.1 Analytical Evaluation
Let m′ be a content consisting of random bytes that is
already present in sec-cs. Goal G2 states that insertion
of m differing only in a sequence of δ bytes should cause
storage costs in O (δ + log |m|). To work these costs out
more precisely, we analyze the border cases first.
Border Case: δ = |m| If δ = |m|, chunk trees t and t′
of m and m′ are not expected to share any nodes, so stor-
age of m should cause costs in O (|m|) acc. to the stated
goal. (Note that this case also covers Goal G1.) Since leaf
chunks have average length S, the expected number of
leaf nodes of t is |m|S . For the same reasons as in the proof
in Sec. 5 (S > 2R implies superchunks are expected to
have ≥ 2 children), t has more expected leaf than super-
chunk nodes, so its total expected number of nodes is:
EXPNC|m| ≤
⌈
2 · |m|
S
⌉
(2)
Every chunk tree node has an expected size of S ac-
cording to Sec. 3 and is stored under a D-byte digest, so
storage costs for this case are as follows:
STORAGEC|m| = (D + S) · EXPNC|m| (3)
Border Case: δ = 1 If δ = 1, m and m′ differ only in
1 byte. Here, storage costs depend on ML-*’s underlying
chunking strategy C. In case of C = SC, t and t′ differ
in exactly one node at each level, each having size ≤ S,
which trivially results in the following storage costs:
ADDSTRGSCh ≤ (D + S) (h+ 1) (4)
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For C = CDC, however, the situation is more complex.
First, δ = 1 allows for shifting in case of CDC. Second,
t and t′ might differ in more than one node at each level.
The reason is that the modification of a single byte might
change up to W chunk boundaries at each level of the
chunk tree, probably causing extra chunks to be inserted
as well. To determine the total average number of chunk
tree nodes that are inserted in this case, we analyze how
many new chunks are created at each chunking level.
Let us fix some height h′, 0 ≤ h′ ≤ h. At height h′ = h
we only have a single (root) chunk that represents the
whole content m. At height h′ < h we deal with chunks
of average length S
h′+1
Rh′
(a position is a boundary with
probability R
h′
Sh′+1
) according to Sec. 3. When consider-
ing a fixed W -byte window containing the changed byte,
the probability that this window yields a chunk bound-
ary in m but did not yield a chunk boundary in m′ is(
1− Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
·
(
Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
. The same probability holds for
the case in which a chunk boundary present in m′ is not
present in m anymore. As the resulting new chunks and
the chunk that has to be inserted anyway at this level
are not necessarily consecutive5, creation (omission) of
a chunk boundary in contrast to m′ might cause up to 1
(2) additional chunks at height h′, respectively.
Since there are up to W window contents contain-
ing the changed byte at each chunking level and each
position yields 1 or 2 new chunks each with probabil-
ity
(
1− Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
·
(
Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
, we expect up to 1 + (1 +
2)W
(
1− Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
·
(
Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
new chunks at height h′. As
we have a single changed chunk at height h, we get the
following upper bound for the expected number of chunk
tree nodes differing between t and t′:
EXPNNCDCh ≤ 1 +
h−1∑
h′=0
(
1 + 3W
(
1− R
h′
Sh′+1
)
Rh
′
Sh′+1
)
(5)
While chunking is performed in a way that achieves an
average size of S for every chunk when applied to random
content, we cannot assume an average size of S for addi-
tional chunks created for inserting m in addition to m′.
The rationale is that new chunks are created from existing
chunks not chosen uniformly at random: A random po-
sition in a content is more likely to hit large chunks than
smaller ones as more positions are covered by them.
Consider the chunks of m′ at some fixed height h′. As
each byte position is a height-h′ chunk boundary with
probability p = R
h′
Sh′+1
, the probability for a chunk hav-
ing length c is (1− p)c−1 · p. Note that 0 < p < 1
5Changing a single byte might change up to W boundaries in an
area of W bytes after the change position, but only the chunk before the
first boundary contains the change. If two consecutive boundaries in this
area exist in m′ and m, the chunk in between is unchanged, but might
be followed by changed chunks if further boundaries are changed.
since S > R. As we expect an average number of
|m′|/ 1p chunks at height h′ in total, the expected number
of length-c chunks at height h′ is |m′|p · (1− p)c−1 · p.
Since each of those chunks covers c bytes and since the
total content length is |m′|, the fraction of the content that
is covered by chunks of length c is:(
c
|m′|
)
· |m′|p · (1− p)c−1 · p = cp2 · (1− p)c−1
Thus, the expected length of a height-h′ chunk at a po-
sition chosen uniformly at random is:
|m′|∑
c=1
c
2
p
2 · (1− p)c−1 =p<1
p2
1− p
|m′|∑
c=1
c
2 · (1− p)c
≤ p
2
1− p
∞∑
c=1
c
2 · (1− p)c =|1−p|<1
(
p2
1− p
)(
p2 − 3p+ 2
p3
)
=
p2 − 3p+ 2
p(1− p) =
2
p
− 1 = 2
(
Sh
′+1
Rh′
)
− 1
As height-h′ superchunks store R-byte references to
height-(h′ − 1) chunks of avg. length Sh
′
Rh′−1
and as size
equals length for leaf chunks, the exp. size of a height-h′
chunk at a random position (and thus the exp. size of any
chunk created when inserting m) is upper-bounded by:
EXPCHUNKSIZECDC ≤ 2 · S (6)
This results in the following storage requirement:
ADDSTRGCDCh ≤ (D + 2S) EXPNNCDCh (7)
Remaining Case: 1 < δ < |m| In the remaining case,
i.e., m differing from m′ in a sequence of more than 1 but
less than |m| bytes, both the first and the last byte of the
change bytestring affect chunks as in the case δ = 1. For
ML-CDC, they are likely to be part of large chunks of ex-
pected length 2S for the same reasons as discussed above.
We conservatively estimate that these two bytes cause
storage costs of 2 ·ADDSTRGCh (with h =
⌈
log |m|
S
(
S
R
)⌉
).
The remaining bytes are either part of those chunks (so
their storage costs have already been accounted for), or
they result in the same chunks that would be created if
they were inserted into sec-cs as a separate content,
causing storage costs up to STORAGECδ−2. Thus, we es-
timate the total storage requirement as follows:
DELTASTRGCh,δ ≤ 2 · ADDSTRGCh + STORAGECδ−2 (8)
As h is logarithmic in |m|, all cases fulfill Goal G2.
7.2.2 Empirical Evaluation
As there are no conceptual differences between ML-SC
/ ML-CDC w.r.t. to the goal evaluated in this section, we
focus on the more interesting ML-CDC scheme in the em-
pirical evaluation. We perform experiments with our im-
plementation (see Sec. 6) meeting the parameters from
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Sec. 7.1, using a Rabin-Karp-based CDC scheme with
window size W = 48 bytes (based on evaluation results
of the CDC authors [28]) and no min/max chunk size set.
We simulate the scenario from the analytical evalua-
tion: We choose a content m of size |m| uniformly at ran-
dom, insert it into an empty sec-cs instance and remem-
ber its state. We replace a randomly chosen δ-bytes sub-
string (1 ≤ δ ≤ |m|) ofm by a different δ-bytes substring
chosen uniformly at random, insert the resulting content
m′ and compare sec-cs’s size to the remembered one
to measure increase in storage costs. We executed the ex-
periment 20 times for each combination of content size
|m|, chunk size S and δ, including border cases {1, |m|}.
Fig. 1 compares empirical and analytical results for
δ = 1, showing the minimal expected storage overhead
for insertion of highly redundant contents. Solid lines
show the calculated relation between content sizes and in-
crease in storage costs for different chunk sizes. While
sublinear growth is visible for either chunk size, smaller
sizes result in even lower storage costs, unless the chunk
size is chosen unreasonably small: For the smallest eval-
uated chunk size (64 bytes), costs incurred by additional
superchunk levels outweigh the smaller per-chunk costs.
Threshold content sizes resulting in a respective num-
ber of chunking levels are indicated by the positions of the
numbers in the chart. The reason for the leaps at threshold
sizes is that our estimate is based on a constant chunk size,
while root nodes are smaller in practice (proportional to
content size for a fixed tree height), resulting in smaller
trees. Empirical results confirm growth is smoother in
practice: Dotted lines show LOESS [11] curves fitted to
the measured increase in storage costs (smoothing param-
eter 0.75, degree 2), summarizing its relation to content
length for the respective chunk sizes. Results are in line
with the calculated upper bounds, confirming sublinear
growth in general and least overhead for S = 128.
To verify whether the most promising chunk size of
S = 128 bytes also yields small overheads for larger mod-
ifications, results for S = 128 in the general case (δ ≥ 1)
are shown in detail in Fig. 2. Solid lines represent analyti-
cal upper bounds for different modification lengths, yield-
ing least costs for δ = 1 (red). Empirical data including
outliers (black points) are illustrated as box plots, which
are barely visible since they indicate rather small fluctua-
tions in storage costs. The box plots confirm that the ana-
lytical bound is conservative, especially for δ > 1: Even
outliers are below their corresponding analytical line.
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7.3 Comparison of WFC / SC / CDC / ML-*
We compare performance of ML-* empirically to that of
the other approaches. To allow a fair comparison, we eval-
uate all schemes with sec-cs. Note that all schemes
are in fact special cases of ML-SC / ML-CDC: Fixing the
height of generated chunk trees to 1 results in SC / CDC,
respectively, where all metadata representing a content are
collected in a single root node; a fixed height of 0 maps
each content to a leaf-only tree, corresponding to WFC.
7.3.1 No-Deduplication Storage Overhead
Every scheme incurs storage overhead that is necessary to
enable data deduplication. In case of WFC, only a small
digest (i.e., a hash value) has to be stored for each content
for this purpose, resulting in constant overhead. When
smaller chunks are stored, overhead is incurred both due
to the digests for individual chunks and for storage of a
content’s representation, i.e., a list of digests of chunks
needed to reconstruct it. This overhead is usually compen-
sated by savings from storage of deduplicable contents.
Before comparing the savings achieved by the different
schemes, we take a look at the overhead that is incurred
when non-deduplicable contents are stored. We instanti-
ate sec-cs for each chunking strategy and with different
chunk sizes and perform the following experiment: We in-
sert a fixed-size content chosen uniformly at random into
the empty data structure and measure the storage expan-
sion factor, i.e., total storage costs divided by the actual
content size. We repeat the experiment for different con-
tent sizes, 20 times for each combination of parameters.
The LOESS curves in Fig. 3 show the measured expan-
sion factor for different content sizes, which is constant
for larger content sizes. It shows that the expansion factor
is nearly 1 (in fact, storage overhead is constant: 32 bytes
per content) for WFC (solid black line) and slightly above
1 for any scheme with small chunk sizes. With higher
chunk sizes, the overhead grows significantly: SC/CDC
(dotted lines) have an expansion factor of 1.25 / 1.5 /
2.0 for chunk sizes 64 / 128 / 256; the expansion factor
for ML-* (dashed lines) is even higher due to additional
storage of non-root superchunk nodes. Interestingly, ML-
CDC produces even more storage overhead than ML-SC.
This is due to the concept of ML-* handling each chunk
as individual content. In case of ML-SC, the last nodes at
each chunk tree height represent chunks smaller than S,
causing overproportional costs, while any other node is
the root of a full, balanced tree. In ML-CDC, these costs
are caused recursively by the last nodes of every subtree.
7.3.2 Deduplication Overhead without Shifting
To measure possible savings from deduplication, we mod-
ify the previous experiment: We insert a second content
that differs from the first in only a single byte at an off-
set chosen uniformly at random. Fig. 4 shows the to-
tal increase in storage costs after the second content has
been inserted: For WFC, increase corresponds to the in-
serted content’s size; for SC/CDC, storage costs are only
a fraction of that thanks to deduplication, but still linear in
the content size. Costs of ML-SC/ML-CDC are orders of
magnitude lower and sublinear in the content size.
7.3.3 Deduplication Overhead with Shifting
To account for the strengths of CDC, we perform a slight
modification of the previous experiment: Instead of over-
writing, we insert a random byte at a random position,
leading to a shift of the remaining content. Results are
shown in Fig. 5: As expected, performance of WFC, CDC
and ML-CDC is comparable to the previous experiment
since they are robust against shifting. SC and ML-SC,
however, yield storage costs of about half of the content
size for chunk sizes≥ 256 (with slight variations in chunk
sizes), which corresponds to an expected amount of 50%
of the content being before the shift position and thus
deduplicable. Observe that costs for SC with S = 64
are similar to WFC, due to storage expansion factor 2.
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Figure 4: Storage costs for modified content (overwrite)
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Figure 7: Storage costs for many similar 10 MiB contents
7.3.4 Break-Even Analysis
Sec. 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 have shown that ML-* is signifi-
cantly more efficient than today’s common deduplication
strategies when storing contents that differ only slightly
from already stored ones, especially for small chunk sizes.
However, Sec. 7.3.1 has shown that this efficiency comes
at the cost of a higher storage expansion factor, i.e., stor-
age of non-deduplicable contents is more expensive in
presence of ML-* and small chunk sizes. This raises the
question as to whether and when ML-* is preferable. Intu-
itively, this is the case whenever storage of many versions
of contents is involved, e.g., in a backup scenario. We in-
vestigate this as follows: We start with a fresh sec-cs
instance containing a single, random 1 (10) MiB content.
Then we insert modifications of this content and measure
storage costs after each inserted version.
Fig. 6 (Fig. 7) shows LOESS curves displaying
smoothed results over 20 runs for each combination of
parameters: As expected, WFC yields storage costs of
about 1 MiB (10 MiB) for every stored content version.
Costs for CDC are only a fraction thanks to deduplica-
tion: 2048 ≤ S ≤ 8192 (8192 ≤ S ≤ 16384) yields low-
est costs; for other chunk sizes, CDC incurs significantly
higher costs. If only few versions are stored, ML-CDC
yields slightly lower costs for any chunk size between
256 and 8192 (32768) bytes. The more content versions
are stored, the more significant are the savings by ML-
CDC: When 125 (250) similar versions are stored, ML-
CDC with 256 ≤ S ≤ 1024 (256 ≤ S ≤ 4096) requires
only half of the storage space as the most-efficient CDC
variant; for 1000 versions, costs are orders of magnitude
lower. Note that we omitted results for SC / ML-SC for
readability: Due to shifting, they are close to WFC.
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Figure 8: Storage costs for revisions of Redis git repository
7.3.5 Real-Life Data Comparison
While the previous experiments have proven ML-*’s
superiority in hypothetical scenarios involving slight
changes on random data, it remains to be analyzed how
good it performs in real life. We leave an extensive eval-
uation (e.g., involving a backup system) for future work,
but perform the following experiment as a starting point:
We insert content versions into sec-cs as before, but in-
stead of random data, we insert all file contents of all revi-
sions (as of 2016-05-16) of the Redis key-value database
git repository [32] and measure sec-cs’s storage costs.
Results (Fig. 8) are promising: With about 512 MiB for
all 5693 revisions, WFC causes by far the highest costs.
SC / ML-SC can only slightly reduce these costs as they
are not robust against shifting. Costs for CDC are lower
and range from about 64 MiB for 512 ≤ S ≤ 2048 to
256 MiB for S = 64. For S ≥ 2048, performance of
ML-CDC is comparable to CDC as only a single chunk-
ing level is used for most files acc. to Eq. 1. For smaller
S, ML-CDC is significantly more efficient than the other
schemes. ML-CDC with 128 ≤ S ≤ 256 performed best,
causing only about 38 MiB of total storage costs, which is
rather close to the 21 MiB required by (unencrypted) git.6
6Note that comparison between git and sec-cs is unfair: Git ac-
cepts additional computational overhead by computing deltas across
contents and it applies compression to aggregated contents which is only
possible since it does not support encryption, unlike sec-cs.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced a data structure for encrypted and
authenticated storage of file contents, sec-cs, that em-
ploys a novel multi-level chunking strategy, ML-*, to
achieve storage efficiency. The data structure transpar-
ently deduplicates identical parts of file contents with-
out relying on information about relations between them,
and achieves storage costs for highly redundant contents
logarithmic in their lengths. We have proven its secu-
rity and evaluated efficiency extensively w.r.t. other com-
mon deduplication concepts. A ready-to-use, open source
Python implementation has been published as part of our
work as to allow integration in other software projects.
As next step, we work on a backup system based on
sec-cs and on an extension that supports partial read
and write access to contents, making it suitable as backend
for future file systems based on untrusted cloud storage.
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